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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 940404-CA

v.
Priority No. 15

JOSEPH A. CHAVEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Joseph A. Chavez appeals the trial court's
denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to burglary, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1990) and the trial court's revocation of his probation pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1994).

This Court

has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1994).
Defendant originally filed two separate appellate
briefs in this matter (Nos. 940404-CA and 940405-CA).

However,

on the State's motion, this Court, by Order dated 06 December
1994, consolidated the appeals under Case No. 940404-CA.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court correctly found no good

cause for defendant to withdraw his guilty plea to the offense of
burglary.

"We review the trial court's denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard.
The trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with its
decision will not be set aside unless they are clearly
erroneous.11
2.

State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)
Whether the trial court correctly revoked

defendant's probation, based on his guilty plea to burglary,
prior to a decision on appeal from the denial of defendant's
motion to withdraw that guilty plea.
"Defendant must show that the evidence of a probation
violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's
findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its
discretion in revoking defendant's probation."

State v. Jameson,

800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (Supp. 1994), which
governs offense level reductions, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)
(1990) , governing plea withdrawal motions, and Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(12) (Supp. 1994), governing probation revocation, are
copied in appendix A of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with burglary, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), and
giving false information to a police officer, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1990) (R.
1, 2). Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to the

2

burglary; the misdemeanor charge was dismissed (R. 32) . For the
burglary, defendant was sentenced to a prison term of one to
fifteen years (R. 56). Subsequently, defendant moved to withdraw
his guilty plea (R. 36). The court denied the motion (R. 51).
At the time he pled guilty to the burglary, defendant
was on probation imposed upon a prior conviction for retail
theft, a third degree felony (R. 41). Upon learning of the
burglary plea, defendant's probation officer moved for an order
to show cause why defendant's probation should not be revoked (R.
41, 42). A hearing was held, and the trial court revoked
defendant's probation.1

Defendant appeals both the denial of

his plea withdrawal motion and the revocation of his probation.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
As part of defendant's plea bargain on the seconddegree felony burglary charge, the State agreed to "take no
position at sentencing" (R. 29). At sentencing on 08 April 1994,
defendant asked the court to enter the conviction as a thirddegree felony, under the level-reduction allowance of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (Supp. 1994), to reduce his possible sentence
from one-to-fifteen years to zero-to-five years (R. 52). The
State objected (R. 52). The sentencing court assumed that the
State opposed the offense level reduction because it was not part

Although defendant's probation agreement is not contained in
the record on appeal, the probation officer's affidavit recites
that defendant violated the customary agreement to obey the law
while on probation (R. 41).
3

of the plea agreement (R. 53). Upon consultation with defendant,
defense counsel made the following statement:
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, for the record, I have
discussed with Mr. Chavez my opinion if the State
took this position that it would be a violation of
the plea negotiation and allow him to withdraw his
guilty plea, or to ask this matter be assigned to
a different judge for sentencing. I have
discussed it with him. He does not want to do
either. He wants to get sentenced.
(R. 54). Upon review of defendant's criminal record, the trial
court sentenced him to a prison term of one to fifteen years (R.
56).

Three days later, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty

plea (R. 36). The court denied defendant's motion (R. 51).
The probation revocation hearing was subsequently held
before a different district court judge.

Defendant explained to

the court that he was appealing the denial of his motion to
withdraw the burglary plea and stated that he was prepared to be
sentenced at that time (T. 7/5/94 at 7).

Finding that defendant

had violated the terms of his probation agreement, the judge
revoked defendant's probation.

He sentenced defendant to the

original term of zero-to-five years, to run concurrently with the
burglary sentence of one-to-fifteen years.2

2

The transcript of the 05 July 1994 probation revocation
hearing, partially copied in the addendum to defendant's brief (No.
940404-CA) , was not included in the record on appeal. A full copy
of the transcript, obtained by the Utah Attorney General, is in
appendix B of this brief.
The judgment revoking defendant's
probation, also dated 05 July 1994, is styled as a commitment to
the Utah State Prison, and also was not included in the record on
appeal. It was, however, appended to defendant's notice of appeal,
and is copied in appendix C of this brief.
4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because there was no good cause shown.
First, defendant abandoned his claim of a breached plea agreement
when he agreed to be sentenced following the prosecutor's
objection to his motion to reduce the offense level on the
burglary.

Further, defendant proffered no showing, as required

by the level-reduction statute, that it would be unduly harsh to
sentence him at the level to which he pled guilty.

Finally, the

State's objection to the level reduction was proper, because such
reduction was not contemplated within the plea bargain.
The trial court properly revoked defendant's probation
because he committed the pled-to burglary in violation of his
probation agreement.

Defendant provides no authority or analysis

to support his proposition that the trial court should wait for a
decision on appeal from the motion to withdraw his guilty plea
before revoking his probation.

Because a criminal conviction is

valid until overturned on appeal, it is proper to revoke
probation for another offense, based upon such conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court."
Ann. §

77-13-6 (2) (a) (1990).

Utah Code

For three reasons, the trial court

5

in this case properly found no good cause for defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea.
A.

BY AGREEING TO BE SENTENCED FOLLOWING
DISCUSSION OF THE PROSECUTOR'S OBJECTION,
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE STATE
BREACHED THE PLEA AGREEMENT
First, defendant waived his claim that the State, by

objecting to an offense level reduction, breached the plea
agreement to "take no position" at sentencing.
found that

The trial court

fl

[t]he whole issue was discussed on the record, and

the defendant agreed to go forward with sentencing and not have
his plea withdrawn at that time" (R. 68). "[W]hen a trial judge
makes findings of fact in conjunction with its decision [to deny
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea], those findings will not be
set aside unless they are clearly erroneous."
844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992).

State v. Gardner,

Defendant offers no proof that

the trial court clearly erred in finding that he agreed to let
the plea stand despite the State's alleged breach.
That finding is amply supported by the record.

Defense

counsel's statement to the trial court, following the State's
objection to defendant's level-reduction motion, clearly reflects
that defendant knew of his option to move to withdraw his plea,
based upon the State's alleged breach of the plea bargain.3

3

This occurred during the 08 April 1994 sentencing hearing.
Defendant had earlier moved for an offense level reduction when he
pled guilty on 16 March 1994, eliciting an objection from the State
(R. 54) . Thus defendant twice declined an option to claim that the
State's objection justified withdrawal of his plea.
6

Defendant did not so move.

Rather, upon consultation with

counsel, he decided to be sentenced forthwith (R. 54).
The legal consequence of defendant's decision is plain.
Defendant affirmatively waived his challenge to the State's
objection as a violation of the plea bargain.
resurrect that challenge on appeal.

He cannot

See State v. Elm, 808 P.2d

1097, 1099 (Utah 1991).
B.

THE STATE FULFILLED ITS PLEA AGREEMENT WITH
DEFENDANT
Next, the State's objection to defendant's level

reduction motion did not breach the plea bargain.

The State

agreed to "take no position" at sentencing, but did not agree to
"take no position" as to the offense level (R. 52). The plea
agreement was based on defendant pleading to a second-degree
felony (R. 27).
The State objected to the offense level reduction
because it was outside the plea agreement (R. 52). The
prosecutor stated that "according to the plea bargain that we
have, that was not part of [it to] sit on the hands for [section
76-3-] 402" (R. 52). Defense counsel himself conceded that
"[n]othing was said" in the plea bargain about a level reduction
(R. 53). The trial court observed that if the State had intended
the defendant to be sentenced to a lower-level crime, that would

7

have been part of the plea agreement (R. 53, 70). The court
properly refused to insert a new term into the agreement.4
Defendant mis-relies on Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971), to support his claim that he should be allowed
to withdraw his guilty plea because the State objected to the
offense level reduction.

In Santobello, the prosecutor agreed to

make no sentence recommendation; at sentencing, a new prosecutor
urged the maximum sentence.

Id. at 258, 259.

The United States

Supreme Court held that "when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it
can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such
promise must be fulfilled."

Id. at 262.

This case differs from Santobello because the State did
not make a recommendation as to sentencing.

The State merely

objected to a reduction of the offense level, arguing that the
level stated in the plea agreement should stand (R. 52). Indeed,
the plea agreement includes defendant's acknowledgment that he
could receive a one-to-fifteen year sentence for the seconddegree burglary (R. 27, 29). Within that range, the State made
no recommendation about the sentence to be imposed, honoring its
"take no position" promise.
Defendant's reliance upon State v. Bennett, 657 P.2d
1353 (Utah 1983), is also misplaced.
4

Bennett involved a trial

Under contract law, ambiguities in a written instrument are
construed against the drafter. Wilburn v. Interstate Elec, 748
P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1988), cert, dismissed, 774 P.2d 1149
(Utah 1989) . The plea agreement, at best ambiguous on the level
reduction question, was drafted by defense counsel.
8

court's rejection of the State's sentencing recommendation.

On

appeal from the sentence, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the
court was under no obligation to accept the prosecution's
recommendation."

Id. at 1354. Bennett has no relevance to this

case because there was no recommendation by the prosecutor.
While no case law appears to be squarely on point, a
Colorado case supports the view that agreeing to "take no
position" at sentencing does not include taking no position on
the offense level.

In People v. Standish, 701 P.2d 633, 633

(Colo. App. 1985), the defendant pled guilty to second degree
murder; the prosecutor agreed to take no position at sentencing.
But at sentencing, the prosecutor commented that the facts would
support a first degree murder conviction.

Id. at 634. The

Colorado court held that the prosecutor's comment did not violate
the plea agreement because it included no recommendation on how
to sentence the defendant within the range prescribed for the
offense level defendant pled guilty to.

Id. at 634.

The prosecutor comment in Standish was more problematic
than the objection to level reduction in this case, because it
suggested that the court should sentence defendant to the higher
end of the range prescribed for the pled-to offense.

In this

case, the prosecutor's objection made no suggestion as to what
sentence defendant should receive within the range prescribed for
the second-degree felony defendant pled guilty to.

There being

no reversible error in the more problematic Standish comment,
there should be none in the prosecutor's objection in this case.
9

C.

IT WAS NOT UNDULY HARSH TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT
FOR A SECOND DEGREE FELONY
Finally, defendant's level reduction motion was not

properly supported.

He proffered no showing that it would be

"unduly harsh" to enter his burglary conviction at the second
degree felony level to which he pleaded guilty (see R. 52). That
omission effectively divested the trial court of any discretion
to reduce the burglary conviction to the third degree felony
level under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (Supp. 1994).

The trial

court tacitly recognized as much, commenting that it would not
have granted a level reduction even if the State had not objected
to defendant's motion (R. 70).
Further, defendant does not contest the trial court's
finding that, based upon his past criminal record and as
recommended by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, a
one-to-fifteen year sentence was appropriate (R. 54-55) .
Therefore, because there was no legal justification to enter his
burglary conviction at a lower level, defendant cannot complain
that the trial court's refusal to do so forms good cause to allow
him to withdraw his guilty plea.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REVOKED DEPENDANT'S
PROBATION FOR VIOLATION OP HIS PROBATION
AGREEMENT
Defendant next asks this Court to hold that his
probation cannot be revoked until his appeal on the plea
withdrawal question is decided.

For the following three reasons,

that request should also be rejected.
10

A.

THE ISSUE WAS WAIVED BY FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE
REVOCATION PROCEEDING
First, and most fundamentally, this point was waived.

At the probation revocation hearing, defendant informed the judge
that he was appealing the denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea to the burglary (T. 7/5/94 at 6).

However, he never

argued that the trial court lacked authority to revoke his
probation; nor did he request a continuance of the probation
revocation proceedings pending appeal of the plea withdrawal
question (T. 7/5/94).

Utah's probation revocation statute

expressly provides that "[t]he defendant shall show good cause
for a continuance" of revocation proceedings.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-18-1(12) (c) (ii) (Supp. 1994).
In fact, rather than request a continuance, defendant
again stated that he was prepared to be "sentenced" on the
probation matter (T. 7/5/94 at 7).

Thus the question whether the

court could properly act upon that matter, never presented to the
trial court, is not open to appellate review.
B.

DEFENDANT PROVIDES NEITHER AUTHORITY NOR
ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN REVOKING HIS PROBATION
Next, defendant fails to cite supporting authority or

provide legal analysis for his claim that the trial court erred
in revoking his probation prior to a decision on appeal from the
plea withdrawal matter.

Under Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, this Court should decline to review
defendant's unanalyzed claim.

See, e.g., State v. Wareham, 772

P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (refusing to address appellant's claim
11

in the absence of legal analysis and supporting authority); State
v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (this Court has
"routinely declined to consider arguments which are not
adequately briefed on appeal").

Instead, this Court should

assume the correctness of the trial court judgment.

Christensen

v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah App. 1991).
Defendant cites cases for the propositions that
probation revocation must be based on "[w]illful violation of a
condition of probation," State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah
App. 1990) , and that the "court may not ignore fundamental
precepts of fairness," State v. Cowdwell, 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah
1981).

Those cases do not bear on the question defendant

presents--whether the trial court was required to stay the
probation revocation pending appeal on the plea withdrawal
question.

For failure to provide authority or analysis on this

question, defendant's argument should be rejected.
C.

NO RULE COMMANDS THAT PROBATION REVOCATION
SHOULD BE STAYED PENDING APPEAL OF A
CONVICTION FOR A NEW OFFENSE THAT IS GROUND
FOR REVOCATION
Finally, on the merits, probation revocation is not

conditioned upon the decision of an appeal from conviction for a
new offense in violation of probation.

Such procedure would be

contrary to the basis for probation and the procedure for
revocation.
"On a plea of guilty . . . or conviction of any crime
or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of
sentence and place the defendant on probation."
12

Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-18-1 (2) (a) (Supp. 1994).

Defendant must agree to the

conditions of the probation and sign the probation agreement.

If

defendant violates any of the terms of the probation agreement,
the court may revoke the probation.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-

1(12) (e) (ii) (Supp. 1994) .
As a condition of his probation agreement, defendant
agreed to obey all state and federal laws (R. 41). Defendant
admitted that he violated a state law by pleading guilty to
burglary, supporting his final conviction for that offense.

See

State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 207, 171 P.2d 383 (Utah 1946) ("A
plea of guilty is a confession of the correctness of the
accusation").

The trial court found that the burglary conviction

was a violation of defendant's probation agreement and revoked
probation (T. 7/5/94 at 8) .
This Court held in State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586, 591
(Utah App. 1993) that "a conviction is a conviction regardless of
whether it is pending on appeal."

In Gallegos, the defendant

argued that the court could not use prior convictions to enhance
his sentence because he was appealing those convictions.

Id.

This Court rejected that argument because the sentence
enhancement statute only requires a prior conviction; it does not
require that the prior conviction be affirmed on appeal.

Id.

Similarly, in this case, the probation revocation
statute only requires the trial court to find a probation
violation.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12) (e) (ii) (Supp. 1994).

does not require that any new crime forming the violation has
13

It

been affirmed on appeal.

The trial court correctly found that

defendant violated his probation by being convicted of a felony,
regardless of whether he was appealing the conviction.
Therefore, the court properly revoked defendant's probation.
CONCLUSION
As explained in Point One of this brief, the trial
court properly denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea to second degree burglary.

As set forth in Point Two, the

court also properly revoked defendant's probation for his prior
offense, based upon the burglary conviction.

Therefore, the

trial court's judgments should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q G

day of January, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

k

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
MARTIN V. GRAVIS, attorney for appellant, 2568 Washington
Boulevard, Suite 202, Ogden, Utah 84401, this
January, 1995.
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ADDENDA

APPENDIX A

(Supp. 1994)

76-3-402,

Conviction of lower degree of offense.

(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to
be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class
A misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of
probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his
probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney,
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the
interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.

(1990)

77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea.
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good
cause shown and with leave of the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by
motion, and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under
Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(Supp. 1994)

77-18-1- Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension —
Hearings.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court t h a t the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding t h a t the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court t h a t authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe t h a t revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding t h a t the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or t h a t the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
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THE COURT:

Are you prepared, Mr.

Gravis, on Chavez?
MR. DA1NES:

Your Honor, we have a

stipulation in this case, a commitment to the state
prison and a Utah Department of Corrections face
sheet, both of which are state records kept in the
usual course of business for the state; however,
neither one is certified.

They will stipulate for

the purpose of this hearing that these are, in fact,
accurate records and proceedings.
MR, GRAVIS:

That's correct, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. DAINES:

very well.
We would call Mr. Ray

Salaz to the stand*
RAYMOND J. SALAZ,
being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as
follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DAINES:
Q.

State your name and occupation, please.

A.

Raymond J. Salaz-

I work for the Department of

Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole.
Q*

Mr. Salaz, calling your attention to the

gentleman seated here at counsel table in the blue

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
(801) 399-8510

1

shirt, do you know him?

2

A

3

Q*

What is his name?

4

A.

Joseph A* Chavez.

5

Q.

How do you know him?

6

A.

He was placed on probation initially with the --

7

through the Second District Court , and I've* been his

8

supervising officer*

9

Q

*

Yes, I do.

Do you —

did you bring with you today his

*

10

Probation Agreement?

11

A.

Yes, I have.

12

Q.

Is the Probation Agreement kept in the usual and

13

customary course of the business of the Department of

14

Corrections department —

15

or whatever they call themselves?

16

A.

Field Operations.

17

Q-

In other words, AP&P?

18

A.

AP&P, yes.

19

Q

Okay.

I mean, Field Op Division

And did you bring that with you today?

*

20

A.

Yes, I have.

21

Q.

Do you —

22

recognize his signature?

23

A.

Yes, I do.

24

Q.

Do you have in your file a si gned Probation

25

Agreement?

having worked with Mr. Chave2:, do you

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R«
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J

1J

A*

Yes, I have.

2

Q*

Signed by Hr. Chavez?

3j

A*

Yes, I have*

4

Q.

is there a provision in that agreement signed by

5

him that makes it a violation of his probation to

6

commit a crime?

7

A*

Yes, there is.

8

Q.

What paragraph is that?

9

A*

That's condition number 5.

10

Q.

Please read that*

11

A.

"I shall1' —

12

MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, we'll

13

stipulate that paragraph 5 contains a not to commit

14

any other crime provision*

15

THE COURT:
(By Mr. Daines)

All right.

16

Q-

Have you further brought with

17

you today a form —

18

form.

19 }

A.

20 I

department face sheet for intake purposes.

21

Q*

22

prison; is that correct?

23

A.

24 j

form to -- identifying characteristics of the case,

25

of the person, the individual, that we use and keep

I don't see a number on this

It's just -- we label it a face sheet, a

And is this —

and that's intake into the state

Actually it's an intake sheet that we use as a

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
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1

as a record in our files*

2

Q.

3

state prison?

4

K.

Yes, I did.

5

Q*

Now, this -- that commitment shows the commitment

6

is for Burglaryr a second Degree Felony; is that

7

correct?

8

A*

Yes, that / s correct*

9

Q.

You have caused to be filed a probation —

Did you, also, bring with you a commitment to the

an

10

Affidavit of Probation Violation alleging Burglary, a

11

Second Degree Felony, as the undergirding charge in

12

the probation violation; is that correct?

13

A.

That's correct.

14

Q*

And that is the Affidavit that is before the

15

court for hearing today?

16

A.

That's correct.

17

Q.

The commitment to the state prison that I'm going

18

to show you here, to which the defense has

19

stipulated, is this the same Burglary, a Second

20

Degree Felony

21

A.

Yes, it is.

22

Q*

—

23

A-

Yes, it is.

—

as you've alleged in your affidavit?

24

MR. DAINES:

I have nothing further.

25

MR- GRAVIS:

No questions, Your

Laurie Shingle, R.P.R.
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Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. DAINES:

You may step down*
Your Honorf we would —

if I may approach the bench*
THE COURT:
MR* DAINES:

Yes, you may*
This is a non-certified

copy that's been stipulated to.

I don't think you

need the face sheet • That shows a commitment — a
conviction and commitment for Burglary, a Second
Degree Felony T H E COURT:

MR. DAINES;

okay.
And based on that, we

would rest*
THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:
record, Mr. Chavez has —

All right.

Mr. Gravis?

Your Honor, for the

did enter a plea of guilty

to the Second Degree Burglary before Judge Glasmann.
We filed a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea.
heard, I believe, two weeks ago —

It was

three weeks ago.

The decision came down two weeks ago on the 13th of
June*

It was denied*

We have since filed an appeal

on the denial of the Motion to Withdraw a Guilty
Plea*

This hearing was put on today simply to

preserve this issue for appeal on this matter, Your
Honor/ fully understanding that the evidence would be

Laurie Shingle, R*P.R.
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1

before the Court of the conviction.

2

MR. DAINES:

Your Honor night

3

remember this case.

4

Affidavit alleged "convicted of the offense of

5

Burglary", and at that time they objected —

6

defense —

7

filed the motion to withdraw the plea and that was

8

pending at that time, a hearing before a district

9

judge.

10

It was a case where the original

the

to that, because of the fact that they had

We were actually going to put on the offense

11

of burglary, but since that time, apparently the

12

district court has denied the motion to withdraw the

13 I

plea*

14

an assumption that he committed it.

And so we would submit that the conviction is

15

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Well, I think you

16

have preserved the issue from the standpoint of the

17

record•

18

MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, we're

19

prepared to be sentenced at this time*

20

prepared to recommend zero to five, concurrent with

21

the one to 15.

22
23

THE COURT:

Is that correct,

MR* SALAZ:

That's correct, Your

Mr. Salaz?

24
25

Mr. Salaz is

Honor.

Laurie shingle, R.P.R.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. GRAVIS:

3

We'd ask that you

fellow that recommendation.

41

THE COURT:

5

MR. DAINES:

6

All right.

Very well.
We would not object to

that, Your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

Court finds the

8

defendant is in violation of his probation by having

9

been convicted by a plea of guilty of the charge of

10

Burglary.

11

defendant be committed to prison for a period of not

12

less than zero or more than five years.

13

run concurrently with the existing sentences.

14

MR. GRAVIS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

15

MR. CHAVE2:

Thank you*

16 J

THE COURT:

17

It's the order of the Court that the

That's to

Is there any further

matter of business that should come before the Court?

18

KR. DAINES:

19

State's calendar this afternoon, Your Honor.

20

you very much,

21
22
23

THE COURT:

No.

That concludes the
Thank

Court's in recess.

(WHEREUPON, at this time proceedings
conclude.)

24
25
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APPENDIX C

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT/SENTENCE AND
COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE
PRISON

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 921900414

JOSEPH A. CHAVEZ,
Defendant.

The defendant appeared in court for sentencing after conviction by
jury
court _XX plea of guilty
plea of no contest of the offense of Retail Theft, a felony
of the 3RD degree. The defendant is adjudged guilty of this offense and is sentenced as
follows:
Basic Sentence
Not to exceed five years at the Utah State Prison.
Not less than one year nor more than 15 years at the Utah State Prison.
Not less than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison.
Sentence to run [ ] consecutive p(] concurrent with sentence defendant i s new
serving.

[)
[ ]

and state surcharge of $_
Fine of $
j, for a total of$
The court recommends to the Board of Pardons that the defendant receive
credit for [ ] all time previously served [ ]
days.
The court deviates from the sentencing guidelines because it finds
aggravation based on
Additional information^

Restitution
[ ]

Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_

to

State v. CHAVEZ
Case 921900414
Prison Commitment-Page Two
Commitment
he defendant is remanded into the custody of :
The sheriff of Weber County for delivery to the warden of the Utah State
Prison for execution of the sentence.
[^
The warden of the Utah State Prison for execution of this sentence.
Dated this 5TH day of

JULY

Signed:

.,199 4

